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ABSTRACT

Some small-holders are able to generate reliable and substantial income flows
through small-scale dairy production for the local market; for others, a set of
unique transactions costs hinders participation. Cooperative selling institutions
are potential catalysts for mitigating these costs, stimulating entry into the market,
and precipitating growth in rural communities. Trends in cooperative organization
in East-African dairy are evaluated.

Empirical work focuses on alternative

techniques for effecting participation among a representative sample of peri
urban milk producers in the Ethiopian highlands. The techniques considered are
a modern production practice (cross-bred cow use), a traditional production
practice

(indigenous-cow

use),

three

intellectual-capital-forming

variables

(experience, education, extension), and the provision of infrastructure (as
measured by time to transport milk to market). A Tobit analysis of marketable
surplus generates precise estimates of non-participants’ ‘distances’ to market and
their reservation levels of the covariates—measures of the inputs necessary to
sustain and enhance the market. Policy implications focus on the availability of
cross-bred stock and the level of market infrastructure, both of which have
marked effects on participation, the velocity of transactions in the local community
and, inevitably, the social returns to agroindustrialization.
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1. INTRODUCTION

A healthy, enlivened debate at the recent conference, ‘Agroindustrialization,
Globalization and Economic Development’ (Nashville, Tennessee, August 5-6)
supports two conclusions. First, while we are reasonably sure about the ceteris
paribus impacts of increased commercialization in developing food systems, we
know less about its ‘trickle-down’ effects on the rural poor, their predisposition
toward exchange, and the institutional and production innovations that underlie
these impacts. Second, given the necessary data, there is enormous scope for
empirical inquiry around these themes and the use of modern techniques to
derive sound policy conclusions.

This paper considers one recent trend in the commercialization of subsistence
agriculture that has potential to catalyze market participation, enhance the
velocity of transactions and sustain economic growth in rural communities. The
topic is the emergence of cooperative sales organizations among resource-poor,
dairy producers in peri-urban settings.

Small scale dairy production is an important source of cash income for
subsistence farmers in the East African highlands.

Dairy products are a

traditional consumption item with strong demand, and the temperate climate
allows the cross-breeding of local cows with European dairy breeds to raise
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productivity. Particularly where infrastructure and expertise in dairy processing
exist, such markets allow small-holders to participate in the agroindustrial subsector and potentially in regional export markets and beyond. Moreover, growth
in dairy demand in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is projected to increase over the
next twenty years due to expected population and income growth.

Milk

production and dairy product consumption are expected to grow in the region of
3.8 to 4% annually between 1993 and 2020 (Delgado et al., 1999). Increased
domestic dairy production has the potential in much of SSA to generate
additional income and employment and thereby improve the welfare of rural
populations (Walshe et al., 1991; Winrock International, 1992; Staal et al., 1997).
However, there are concerns that the benefits of this expected growth may
bypass resource-poor livestock producers unless specific policy actions are
taken.

Barriers to small-holder participation in dairy production range from the
availability and cost of animals to the labor needed to bring products to market.
Despite the potential, small-holder participation in market-led dairy development
has not been widespread in SSA outside of Kenya.

Even in regions with

favourable climates for livestock development, such as the Ethiopian highlands,
participation in fluid milk markets by rural small-holders has been limited.
Changes in sectoral and macroeconomic policies are frequently necessary, but
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not sufficient, to provide the requisite incentives for small-holders to participate in
markets.

Small-scale milk producers face many hidden costs that make it difficult for them
to gain access to markets and productive assets (Staal et al., 1997). Among the
barriers that may be influenced by policy are transactions costs—the pecuniary
and non-pecuniary costs associated with arranging and carrying out an
exchange of goods or services. The existence of relatively high marketing costs
for fluid milk in Africa, the prevalence of thinness in fluid milk markets and the
riskiness attached to marketing perishables in the tropics suggest that
transactions costs play a central role in dairy production and marketing. Under
such conditions, producer marketing co-operatives that effectively reduce
transactions costs may enhance participation. Hence, it is vital to know what
governments can do to better support these organizations and their emergence,
and determine whether alternative institutions should be encouraged.
This paper explores the impact of household-level transactions costs and the
choice of production technique on the decision of farmers to sell fluid milk to
marketing cooperatives using a detailed sample of observations from the
Ethiopian highlands (Nicholson, 1997). Covariates representing factors affecting
production, consumption and marketable surplus are examined in order to
determine the extent to which they influence the milk-marketing decision.
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In the conceptual framework we employ, transactions costs include not only the
costs of exchange, but also the complete set of costs implied when households
must reorganize and reallocate labor in order to generate a marketable surplus.
These costs may be substantial, may dominate other, observable (pecuniary)
costs and, therefore, are scrutinized. We focus on a parsimonious set of factors
conjectured to affect them, namely a modern production practice (cross-bred
cow use), a traditional production practice (indigenous-cow use), three
intellectual-capital-forming variables (experience, education, extension), and the
provision of infrastructure (as measured by time to transport milk to market). We
compute estimates from a Tobit specification of marketable surplus and use the
estimates to draw policy conclusions.

Section two provides a background on the transactions-costs issue. Section
three considers cooperatives as examples of an agroindustrial innovation with
the potential to catalyze the emergence of milk markets. Section four presents a
brief introduction to milk-marketing organization in the Ethiopian highlands,
section five describes the household survey, and section six presents the data.
Section seven motivates the Tobit model and section eight presents results.
Discussion and conclusions are offered, respectively, in sections nine and ten.
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2. TRANSACTIONS COSTS, COOPERATIVES AND MILK-MARKET
PARTICIPATION

Transaction costs are the embodiment of barriers to access to market
participation by resource poor small-holders.

They include the costs of

searching for a partner with whom to exchange, screening potential trading
partners to ascertain their trustworthiness, bargaining with potential trading
partners (and officials) to reach an agreement, transferring the product,
monitoring the agreement to see that its conditions are fulfilled, and enforcing the
exchange agreement

The nature of milk and its derivatives in part explains the high transactions costs
associated with exchanges of fluid milk. Raw milk is highly perishable and, thus,
requires rapid transportation to consumption centers or for processing into less
perishable forms. Further, bulking of milk from multiple suppliers increases the
potential level of losses due to spoilage. These losses limit marketing options for
small and remote dairy producers, raise transport costs, and imply greater losses
due to spoilage than for commodities such as grains. Because milk production
typically is a year-round activity, dairy producers often must be concerned with
maintaining outlets for their production.
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The search for stable market outlets by producers is complicated by significant
seasonal variation in milk production and dairy product consumption (Jaffee,
1995; Debrah and Anteneh, 1991). In part due to high perishability, but also due
to natural variation, milk quality is variable. Some of its properties (e.g., bacterial
counts) are also not easily ascertained.

Although not a perfect proxy, we

conjecture that distance between production and purchasing points is highly
correlated with quality, which declines rapidly after milking. The lack of easily
measurable quality standards may also allow agents purchasing raw milk from
producers to reject milk without just cause when they have contracted to
purchase more milk than can be profitably sold.

Differential transactions costs among households stem from asymmetries in
access to assets, information, services and remunerative markets (Delgado
forthcoming). Handling these access problems requires institutional innovation.
First, the asset-deficit problem of resource-poor small-holders is often so great
that a net transfer (such as a heifer) is necessary to induce entry. Second,
technical and market information for new commercial items is more likely to be
useful to individuals with higher levels of schooling, greater work experience,
better access to management and technical advice, and better knowledge of
market opportunities. Small-holders may require particular support in information
and management. Third, access to services is often unequally distributed within
communities.

Poor infrastructure, low population density, and low effective
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demand make necessary institutions for risk-sharing and economies of scale in
provision of agricultural services, especially in remoter areas.

Fourth, better

access to remunerative markets for high-value-to weight items is necessary for
promoting growth of small-holder agriculture.
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3. COOPERATIVES AS CATALYSTS

A common form of collective action to address access problems of this type is a
participatory, farmer-led cooperative that handles input purchasing and
distribution and output marketing, usually after some form of bulking or
processing. Farmers gain the benefit of assured supplies of the right inputs at
the right time, frequently, credit against output deliveries, and an assured market
for the output at a price that is not always known in advance, but applied equally
to all farmers in given location and time period. Extension is sometimes part of
the services provided, typically at higher rates (and quality) than state extension
services. Cooperatives, by providing bulking and bargaining services, increase
outlet market access and help farmers avoid the hazards of being encumbered
with a perishable crop with no rural demand. In short, participatory cooperatives
are very helpful in overcoming access barriers to assets, information, services,
indeed, the markets within which small-holders wish to produce high-value items
(Jaffee and Morton, 1995).

Like contract farming, producer cooperatives can offer processors/marketers the
advantage of an assured supply of the commodity at known intervals at a fixed
price and a controlled quality.

They can also provide the option of making

collateralized loans to farmers. For processors or marketers, such arrangements
eliminate the principal-agent issues faced by collectives and outgrower schemes
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in monitoring effort by the individual producer, providing better relations with local
communities than large-scale farms, avoiding the expense and risk of investing
in such enterprises, sharing production risk with the farmer, and helping ensure
that farmers provide produce of a consistent quality (Grosh, 1994; Delgado,
forthcoming).

Producer cooperatives are unlike contract farming schemes, however, with
respect to negotiations among different partners. If the issue in contract farming
revolves around the power of farmers to negotiate with processors in producer
coops, the issue in the coops themselves is the power of members, collectively,
to hold management accountable.

Producer coops in Africa have had a

generally unhappy history, because of difficulties in holding management
accountable to the members (i.e., moral hazard), leading to inappropriate
political activities or financial irregularities in management (de Janvry, Sadoulet,
and Thorbecke, 1993; Akwabi-Ameyaw 1997), and also due to over-ambitious
investment in scale and enterprises beyond management’s capability.

The

degree of moral hazard seems to be greater if cooperatives are general in their
orientations rather than created for specific purposes, such as farmer-run local
milk marketing coops in Uganda and Kenya (Staal et al., 1997). In Ethiopia, on
the other, hand, the perception exists (Nicholson, 1997) that there may be
enormous potential for their role, in concert with production innovations, as
market precipitators.
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4. EXPERIENCE IN ETHIOPIA

The traditional system of milk production in Ethiopia, comprising small rural and
peri-urban farmers, uses local breeds, which produce about 400-680 kg of milk
per cow per lactation period. More recently, intensive systems as diverse as
state enterprises and small and large private farms use exotic breeds and their
crosses, which have the potential to produce 1120-2500 liters per day over a
279-day lactation (Debrah and Anteneh, 1991).

Fresh milk marketing is

channeled through both formal and informal outlets, with informal markets
supplying some 85% of total fresh milk in the Addis Ababa area (Staal, 1995).
The major formal outlets are dominated by a government enterprise called the
Dairy Development Enterprise (DDE), which has established numerous collection
centers that buy milk at a uniform government controlled price that requires no
minimum delivery. In 1992/93, the DDE supplied 12% of total fresh milk sales in
Addis Ababa (Staal, 1995).

The DDE is concerned primarily with fluid milk

marketing, although it does make some cheese and yogurt in its Addis Ababa
processing facilities.

The informal fresh milk market involves direct delivery of raw milk by producers
to consumers in the immediate neighborhood and sales to itinerant traders or
individuals in nearby towns. Milk is transported to towns on foot, by donkey, by
horse or public transport and frequently commands a higher price than in the
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originating locale (Debrah and Antenneh, 1991). In Ethiopia, fresh milk sales by
small-holder farmers are important only when they are close to formal milk
marketing facilities such as government enterprises or milk groups. Results from
a sample of farmers in Northern Shewa in 1986 estimated that 96% of the
marketable milk was sold to the DDE (Debrah and Anteneh, 1991). Farmers far
from such formal marketing outlets prefer to produce other dairy products
instead, such as cooking butter and cottage cheese (table 1). In fact, the vast
majority of milk produced outside urban centers in Ethiopia is processed into
products by the farm household, and sold to traders or other households in local
markets.

The other principal outlets for milk are ‘milk groups,’ which are milk marketing
cooperatives recently established by the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture’s
Small-holder Dairy Development Project (SDDP) with the support of the Finnish
International Development Association.

The milk groups buy milk from both

members and non-members, process it, and sell the derivative products to
traders and local consumers. Although the milk groups sometimes sell fluid milk
products such as sour milk, skim milk, or buttermilk, most of their revenue is
generated by sales of processed dairy products, butter and cottage cheese
(Nicholson, 1998). The groups do not presently represent a significant source of
fresh milk for either rural or urban markets.
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Table 1-Household Sales Composition and Distance to Market
Distance from the DDE Collection Center
0-3 km

3-10 km

Milk sales(liters per
household per day)

3.2

0.1

Butter sales(grams per
household per day)

7.0

96.9

Cheese(grams per
household per day)

0.0

11.3

Total milk equivalent(liters
per household per day)

3.2

2.4

Source: Debrah and Anteneh, 1996.
(insert table 1 about here).
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5. BACKGROUND TO THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION

The SDDP milk groups purchase raw milk from farmers, then use hand-operated
equipment to process the milk into butter, local cottage-type cheese (ayib), and
yogurt-like sour milk (ergo). These dairy products are sold to local households,
to traders who market them, in turn, to major urban centers, and local
restauranteurs. Typically, the value added from processing the fluid milk into
products (less funds retained for maintenance of the groups’ facilities) is returned
as a semi-annual, lump-sum payment to group members and others who have
supplied the group during the period since the previous payment.

At the time of data collection four of these milk groups existed, two in the Shewa
region north of Addis Ababa and two in the Arsi region near the regional center
Asela. The activities of these groups are focused exclusively on the processing
and selling of dairy products. They provide no additional services (i.e., no credit,
feeds, veterinary services, etc.) to farmers nor to buyers and, therefore,
represent the simpler end of the continuum of activities that cooperative
organizations might undertake.

Although the number of farmers and the amount of milk received at each group
is not a large proportion of regional totals, the formation of these groups has
created a new outlet for sales of fluid milk by producers. Prior to the formation of
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the groups, nearly all locally produced milk was processed into butter and ayib by
the households. Even now, most milk produced in these areas is marketed as
home-processed dairy products and sold to traders or other households in local
markets. Thus, the milk groups can be considered organizational innovations
that increase the number of marketing options available to small-holder dairy
farmers and mitigate some of the principal transactions costs that retard entry.
We now turn to the identification of remaining factors (technology, infrastructure
and household capital accumulation) that may forestall entry.
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6. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

Data were collected from four rural communities called ‘Peasant Associations’
(PAs) (which are state-designated partitions of rural districts) near two of the four
milk groups formed by the SDDP.

Preliminary surveys were undertaken in

December 1996 and January 1997 to ascertain the extent of crossbred cow
ownership. On the basis of the preliminary surveys, the Mirti and Ashebaka PAs
in the area of the Lemu Ariya milk group were selected from Arsi region, and the
Ilu-Kura and Archo PAs were selected near the Edoro milk group in Shewa
region.

One PA in each region was close enough to the milk group that

cooperative selling occurred;

the other was distant enough that sales were

precluded. None of the households in the Ashebaka and Archo PAs participated
in the milk groups, whereas a proportion of the households in Mirti and Ilu-Kura
PAs delivered milk to the groups.

A census of households in these four PAs was conducted for the purpose of
developing a sampling frame.

Using the census results, a sample of 36

households was selected in each of the PAs, stratified by whether the household
owned crossbred cows, participated in the group, and their distance to the group
or to another local market where dairy products could be sold. During June
1997, baseline surveys of household characteristics and current cattle
management practices were administered to 144 households. From June 1997
to October 1997, data on milk allocation and marketing, significant events
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occurring in the cattle herd (births, deaths, purchases, sales, illness, etc.), and
cow feeding practices were collected every two to three weeks.

From the survey, we focus on the 68 households in the Mirti and Ilu-Kura PAs for
which samples were observed on milk sales in the seven days prior to three
respective visits, yielding a total of 1428 = 68 ¥ 7 ¥ 3 observations. Table 2
summarizes the data by market participation status
Table 2-Selected characteristics of survey households, by market participation
status
Sample Means (standard errors)

Number of crossbred cows

Number of local cows

Time to the milk group,
minutes

Farm experience of
household head, years

Formal schooling of
household head, years

Visits by an extension
agent during past year

Sold to the milk group

Did not sell to the milk group

0.68
(0.82)

0.59
(0.78)

1.35

1.41

(1.04)

(1.12)

43.27

44.45

(28.36)

(29.13)

25.36

24.50

(15.40)

(15.89)

1.83

1.92

(3.25)

(3.35)

1.03

1.07

(1.92)

(2.16)
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7. ESTIMATION

A Tobit specification using a Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to
derive estimates of the quantities of interest is applied. It is motivated in three
steps. First, household maximization is formalized. Second, relaxing the nonnegativity restriction on marketable surplus, a set of latent values are implied for
the nonparticipating households. Third, because we observe the value zero for
these households rather than the latent quantities, the data are censored and
Tobit estimation is relevant.

Although relatively new, MCMC methods are now widely used in Bayesian
inference. However, applications in development economics have thus far been
few.

Details of the procedure are presented in Chib (1992).

combines Gibbs sampling with data augmentation.

His approach

Seminal contributions in

these two areas are Gelfand and Smith and Tanner and Wong, but very
readable introductions are Casella and George, Chib and Greenberg, and
Tanner.

Let Fi( · ) denote the level of a maximand of interest in household “i” (say, the
level of expected utility); let Fi( · ) denote its first-order partial derivative with
respect to variable, vi (the level of marketable surplus from the household); and
let xi ” (x1i, x2i .. xmi) denote a vector of factors affecting the choice of vi (the
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composition of the physical capital in the household, the physical distance that it
resides from the market, and the stocks of intellectual capital that the household
has accumulated). Then, across each of the households i = 1, 2 .. N, we are
concerned with the problem:
(1)

max
vi

Fi( vi , xi ) subject to vi ‡ 0 ;

the derivative condition on the objective function,
(2)

ji( vi , xi ) £ 0;

the non-negativity restriction on marketable surplus,
(3)

vi ‡ 0;

and the complementary-slackness condition,
(4)

ji( vi , xi ) vi = 0.

Ignoring the restriction in (3) for the moment and assuming strict equality in (2), a
first-order MacLaurin-series expansion in the left-hand side yields
(5)

m

ji + jvi vi + � j xki x ki = 0,
k =1

where the function ji and the partial derivatives jvi and jxki, k = 1, 2 .. m, are
evaluated at the point vi = 0, xi = 0.

Accordingly, we have a (locally) valid

expression relating the household’s choice of vi to the levels of the covariates,
xki, k = 1, 2 .. m, in the linear equation
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m

vi = b0 + � b k x ki ,

(6)

i = 1, 2 .. N;

k =1

-1

-1

b0 ” -ji jvi and bk ” -jxki jvi , k = 1, 2 .. m. But, when vi is negative we actually

observe zero and, therefore, the relevant statistical framework is the censored
regression model
m

zi = b0 + � b k x ki + ei ,

(7)

i = 1, 2 .. N;

k =1

2

ei ~ N( 0 , s ) and we observe yi = max{ zi , 0 }.

Although some interest resides with the parameters in (7), our fundamental
concern lies with the levels of the covariates that are required for participation in
the market, that is, the measures beyond which positive marketable surplus is
implied for the non-participants in the (censor) set c ” { i : zi £ 0 }. The values of
interest follow naturally from setting marketable surplus to zero in (7); solving for
each of the covariates,
m

b 0 + � b j x ji + e i
(8)

j„k

x̂ ki =

-b k

,

k = 1, 2 .. m,

i ˛c;

and computing means across the set of non-participating households, say n in
total,
(9)

x ki

=

1

n

� x̂ ki ,

i˛c

k = 1, 2 .. m.

22

8. RESULTS

Table 3 reports results of the estimation.

All but one of the covariates

(experience) is significant at the 5% level. Thus, each of the other covariates has
a significant impact on marketable surplus and, therefore, entry into the milk
market. Focusing on the parameter estimates themselves, the addition of one
cross-bred cow raises surplus by about 4.4 liters of milk per day and the addition
of one local cow increases surplus by about 1.8 liters—a clear and obvious
difference between the modern and the traditional production techniques.
Distance-to market on the other hand causes surplus to decline, and we
estimate that for each one-hour reduction in return time to walk to the milk-group,
marketable surplus increases by about 3.5 liters.

Of the capital-forming

variables, (experience, education, and extension) education and visits by an
extension agent are significant, but surplus is unresponsive to farm experience.
The estimates of the responses to education and extension are, perhaps, more
important for our study because these variables are potentially more likely to be
directly affected by policy. For each additional year of formal schooling of the
farm decision-maker, daily marketable surplus increases by about 0.30 liters
and, for each additional visit by an extension agent, increases by almost 1.0
liters. The summary statistics suggest a reasonable amount of fit given the high
proportion of censoring in the sample—approximately 85% are nonparticipants.

23

Table 3-Marketable-surplus Tobit-equation estimates
Estimate
Regressor
Number of crossbred cows

(standard error)
4.43
(0.38)

Number of local cows

1.81
(0.26)

Time to the milk group, minutes

-0.06
(0.01)

Farm experience of household head,
years

0.0027
(0.0233)

Formal schooling of household head,
years

0.28
(0.10)

Extension agent visits during the past
year

0.94
(0.11)

Constant

-12.40
(1.39)

Square Root of the Variance

27.47
(3.98)
Summary Statistics
Uncensored observations

R2

0.35

Positive predicted values

63

Negative predicted values

105
Censored observations

R2

0.98

Positive predicted values

21

Negative predicted values

1239
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Turning to the distance measures, table 4 reports point estimates of the
‘distance’ statistics (equation (9)). They are revealing. In order to effect entry,
the representative non-participant must increase surplus by 9.8 liters per day.
Such an increase, it appears, could be effected by a variety of techniques,
including additions to the milking herd of 2.2 crossbred animals or, instead, by
6.4 local cows, a feasible but nonetheless substantial increase in productive
assets.

Of the remaining covariates for which the distance estimates are

significant, entry could also be effected by reducing transport time by almost two
hours or by increasing the frequency of extension visits to around 10 per
household per year.
Table 4-Distance estimates
Estimate (standard error)
Marketable Surplus

-9.81
(5.63)

Number of crossbred cows

2.52
(0.13)

Number of indigenous cows

6.45
(0.67)

Time to the milk group, minutes

-114.26
(33.50)

Farm experience of household head, years

-757.12
(58289.48)

Formal schooling of household head, years

45.26
(444.96)

Extension agent visits during the past year

10.43
(0.91)
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9. DISCUSSION

The policy-relevant variables having the greatest impact on participation in fluid
milk markets are cow numbers, time to the milk group, and visits by an extension
agent. The number of cows kept affects marketable surplus through both total
production and the marginal costs of production.

An increase in total milk

production by the household decreases the marginal utility of milk consumption
and, thus, should increase marketable surplus. In the case where additional
cows lower marginal costs of production, this also increases marketable surplus
because the household is assumed to equate marginal costs of production and
milk price net of transactions costs. Finally, a higher marketable surplus per
farm potentially reduces that farm’s average costs of milk transfer to the group,
as well as lowering average production costs on the farm.

Thus, pooling

activities, especially milk collection and transport activities, has potential to
mitigate costs. However, problems of coordinating and monitoring agreements
between participants and the costs engendered by such ventures is likely to
dissipate any potential gains from exploiting scale economies.

Our empirical analysis does not distinguish among possible scale effects, but this
does not appear to be crucial for policy purposes given the net, positive impacts
of cow numbers (of both breeds) on marketable surplus. The difference between
the impacts of local and crossbred cows on marketable surplus and fluid milk
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market participation has more relevance for policy. In theory, the marginal costs
of milk production are equated for crossbred and local cows if the household
owns both types. However, not all households own both types of cows, and
other market imperfections (e.g., feed and services availability) may imply higher
marginal costs for crossbred animals. Higher marginal costs for crossbred cows
imply a negative gross effect (despite the positive net impact of crossbreds) on
marketable surplus compared to local cows. The magnitude of this effect can be
approximated using annualized milk yield per day for crossbreds and local cows
and multiplying these by the ‘distance’ estimates from table 5.

Annualized milk yields per day from a farm survey in the peri-urban area of Addis
Ababa are 3.9 liters for crossbred cows and 1.2 liters for local cows. Multiplying
these milk yields by the Tobit distance estimates of daily milk production implied
for market entry are 9.8 liters for crossbred cows and 7.7 liters for local cows. If
the estimates reflected only the transactions costs related to the level of
marketable surplus, we would expect these figures to be equal. Further, since
milk prices paid to farmers in this sample do not distinguish between milk from
local and crossbred cows, milk quality can be safely assumed not to contribute to
this difference. The difference can thus be presumed to relate to differences in
technology (including scale effects). Thus the higher milk level needed from
crossbred cows suggests that some 27% more ‘milk production potential’
(capacity) is needed in the form of crossbred cows compared to local cows in
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order to effect entry.

Whether this is related to downside risk of disease,

different feed requirements, or differential scale effects on unit production and
transfer costs, is uncertain. However, the relatively small difference suggests
that although transactions costs related to technological obstacles are evident,
they are not insurmountable.

Further, to the extent that policy and other

interventions can reduce this difference in marginal costs, crossbred cows will
have a larger impact on marketable surplus of fluid milk.

The Tobit estimate of time to milk group shows that sales to the milk group could
be effected by reducing the milk delivery time from farm to collection point by an
average of 114 minutes.

This is clearly related to the transactions costs of

reallocating family labor to milk delivery. Given the current limited number of
milk groups in Ethiopia, and the very large number of rural households with
cattle, this result suggests a potentially simple policy intervention.

Currently,

many potential fluid milk-marketing households are hours distant from any milk
group. Setting up new groups would clearly reduce the time to group for a
number of households close to the group. Of course, the actual number of
households that would benefit depends on local population densities.

Any policy support to raise small-holder participation in milk marketing based on
our analysis of factors influencing fluid milk sales would necessarily have to
weigh public costs against the expected gains by small-holder households. The
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existing milk groups were established by a development project at an estimated
cost of EB 44,350 each, or about $US 5,350; Given prices at the time of group
formation, the cost of a milk group is roughly equivalent in market value to some
10 crossbred cows. Given the density of households in many parts of rural
Ethiopia, one such investment is likely to bring about market entry of more than 4
households, the number implied by the yield of 10 cows. Further, the availability
of crossbred cows for purchase by small-holders is limited. Policies to promote
expansion of crossbred numbers—currently less than 100,000 in Ethiopia—rely
on expansion of the domestic herd, largely at government-owned facilities.
Imports of crossbred cattle are severely restricted (particularly from Kenya) due
to fears of disease risk.

The resulting slow growth of the domestic herd of

crossbred animals also provides support for the formation of cooperatives, with
or without the provision of additional crossbred animals.

The ultimate benefits of participation in fluid milk sales—and the survival of the
milk groups themselves—will depend on their continued ability to capture valueadded in dairy processing and return that value-added to their members. This, in
turn, relies on the groups’ abilities to offer producers a higher return net of
transactions cost than alternative market outlets. Whether they will continue to
do so remains to be seen, but first impressions from our two sample sites are
positive.
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10. CONCLUSIONS

The ideas developed here are simple and so is the message we are motivating:
Institutional innovations by themselves are insufficient to catalyze entry; they
must be accompanied by a mix of other inputs including infrastructure,
knowledge and asset accumulation in the household.

Although it is not

surprising that milk groups increase the participation of small-holders in fluid milk
markets in Ethiopia’s highlands, our empirical results provide insights about how
to promote further market participation by small-holder producers.

Locating

groups so as to minimize the time required to market milk increases the number
of participating producers and the level of marketable surplus.

Given the

difficulty and cost of providing crossbred animals (as experienced by such heiferloan schemes as Heifer Project International in other parts of Africa), investment
in infrastructure such as the milk groups provides a low cost mechanism for
increasing small-holder participation and furthering the integration of traditional
producers into agro-industrial systems. These results are likely to hold relevance
for other perishable and time-constrained agricultural products, such as winter
vegetables, cut flowers, and the like and, perhaps, a wide and broader set of
circumstances.

Milk groups are a simple example of an agroindustrialization innovation, but they
appear to be a necessary first step in the process of developing more
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sophisticated cooperative organizations. Costs of milk production in Ethiopia are
low compared to world prices (Staal, 1995) but high transactions costs for
households and processors alike prevent dairy exports. Thus, derivative impacts
of the innovation in effecting globalization are precluded at present. Time will tell
whether the experience obtained from the milk groups may serve as a basis for
development of producer-oriented processing that better integrates small-holder
producers with global agro-industry.
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